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 This research paper analyzes the connection between human rights abuses committed by 
the Nicolas Maduro regime and the high levels of emigration. These human rights issues are 
addressed by the research question: Have the existing human rights abuses that are committed by 
the Maduro government led to the high levels of emigration that has greatly impacted many 
countries? Human rights abuses are a significant issue within the Venezuelan state, and it is 
important to address other variables some of which include  the economic situation, a decaying 
public health care system, fraudulent elections, COVID-19, and external state actors that have 
led many people to lose faith in their political institutions and forced them to look for new 
opportunities in other countries. A majority of these human rights abuses occurred during the 
Hugo Chavez regime in the 1990s to 2010s and the situation has worsened since Nicolas Maduro 
took control of the country. Research in this area has been growing as many countries, including 
the United States, struggle to create a coherent strategy to the Venezuelan crisis. As the 
international system continues to grapple with the issue of Venezuela in light of new political 
situations, this research question will have continuing importance for foreign policy makers both 
in United States and abroad.  
 
Literature Review  
 Emigration from Venezuela and human rights abuses are pressing issues for the Western 
Hemisphere and will continue to be as long as the Maduro regime maintains power. The 
independent variables I will focus on include: freedom of the press, political repression, 
repression of the opposition party, COVID-19 and a decaying healthcare system, arbitrary 
violence sponsored by the government, arbitrary detentions, the economic sanctions placed by 
external actors, the amount of foreign aid being received by Venezuela, and immigration policies 
of receiving countries. These independent variables all play a role in explaining the dependent 
variable of emigration from Venezuela. There is a broad consensus regarding the importance of 
these variables and how they affect migration flows and the frequency human rights abuses 
perpetrated by the Maduro regime.  
 The Maduro regime has continuously denied freedom of the press and access to 
information by the general population. There are multiple laws prohibiting criticism of the 
regime or the President and have been used to detain reporters and people from the general 
population (State Department). Both journalists and private citizens have been targets of these 
laws as 24 people were arrested for criticizing the government over the internet and 39 
journalists were detained in three months in 2018 (State Department). A majority of the news 
that is easily accessible, is promoted by state run entities or are former state entities that are still 
easily pressured by the Venezuelan government. The Venezuelan government has made it 
evident that freedom of speech, freedom of press, and the free exchange of ideas will not be 
tolerated. These are direct violations of human rights that are standard within the international 
community.  
 The human rights conditions in Venezuela have deteriorated since Nicolás Maduro came 
into power in 2013. Many of the examples given throughout this paper are human rights 
violations, such as the lack of free and fair elections or the inability to access adequate medical 
care.  But there are also a variety of other human rights abuses that occur in Venezuela that are 
also perpetrated by the Maduro government. Arbitrary arrests of political figures and average 
citizens that oppose the government are normal occurrences under the Maduro regime and since 
2014 over 15,000 people have been arrested through connections to different protests (Human 
Rights Watch). Some of these arrests include warrantless arrests at people’s homes and being 
charged under military courts which is standard under dictatorships and is not a new practice in 
Latin America. It is also reported that torture once people are arrested has occurred, but there is 
no way to verify the number of deaths that have occurred due to this or the number of people that 
have suffered as there is no transparency (Human Rights Watch). The use of the military to prop 
up the Maduro regime is to be expected as the authoritarian government under Maduro provides 
a breeding environment that allows for military to repress the population without oversight 
(Davenport, 1995). 
 Connected to arbitrary arrests is the violence perpetrated by the government that occurs 
daily in the country. Venezuela is one of the countries with the highest numbers of violent 
homicide and in 2017 the Observatorio de Venezuela found that 26,616 violent deaths were 
reported and that 15 people were killed per day by the police or the military (Buxton, 2018). It is 
important to note that these numbers are likely owing to the corrupt criminal justice system and 
the lack of accurate reporting in the nation. While the country had a ban on private gun 
ownership, this law did not make a dent in the number of violent deaths in the country (Buxton, 
2018). These numbers have increased owing to the high numbers of colectivos (armed groups 
propped up by the Venezuelan government) and the presence of Las Fuerzas de Acciones 
Especiales (FAES) in the country.  
 When there are high numbers of arbitrary detentions, and the high levels of government 
sponsored violence, it is likely that the international community will see high levels of irregular 
migration from the afflicted country. Many arbitrary detentions are related to opposition politics 
and protests in Venezuela. This mirrors what has happened in many autocratic regimes 
throughout the world. In order to maintain power, countries such as Cambodia, Zimbabwe, and 
Iran have unlawfully detained political dissidents and potential political candidates in order to 
maintain power (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski, 2014). These arbitrary detentions limit the 
power of the opposition party and create democratic backsliding. These detentions of protestors 
and political candidates have been used in South America under many dictators including in 
Chile and Argentina in the 1970s and 80s. State sponsored violence has also been a tool for 
governments to control dissidents. The Fujimori government in Peru during the 1990s used 
paramilitary groups such as the one named rondas campesinos (peasant defense groups) in order 
to attack dissidents that followed the ideas of Sendero Luminoso (Burt, 2006). In all of these 
situations there were migration flows that stemmed from the fear of retribution and the inability 
to express political thoughts freely, therefore I theorize that the arbitrary detentions and 
government backed violence in Venezuela is one of the causes of emigration. 
 When freedom of the press is threatened or restricted, more people will begin to emigrate 
from their country and Venezuela is no exception. The media has always played a watchdog role 
in society, and it is expected that the media reports on human rights abuses perpetrated by the 
government. In authoritarian regimes the media is often restricted, and journalists are often the 
target of attacks. With a lack of free reporting, the population is unable to trust its government as 
the government is able to repress its citizens with no independent watchdog to notify the public 
of its actions. In this paper, media refers to both newsprint and digital independent businesses. 
Demonstrated in the articles by Whitten-Woodring and Kim et. al. (2014), a cyclical relationship 
exists between the media, the general population, and the authoritarian government that is 
displayed in Venezuela. While traditional media has been restricted, there is still some media 
reporting regarding human rights abuses by the government. When these abuses occur, the 
population has protested and their demands have been meet with force and repression instead of 
government reform. This force includes the use of police and military force against civilians, 
forced disappearances, and arbitrary detentions. This cycle has continued, but I take the cyclical 
theory a step further as the opposition now fears the power of the government less people are 
willing to risk the consequences of protesting. This additional step is where the connection 
between emigration and restricted media is highlighted. In connection with the cyclical theory, I 
theorize that as media becomes more restricted and the general population protests less, 
migration becomes the only option to obtain the freedoms that the population does not have in its 
own country. 
 Political repression also plays a role in the human rights abuses and migration that occurs 
in Venezuela. Since 2013, Nicolas Maduro has consistently manipulated the government system 
to aid him, his supporters, and the military. Political repression in this context is defined by 
manipulating elections and limiting the power of the opposition forces within Venezuela. Mostly 
recently in 2020, Venezuela held parliamentary elections in order to elect new representatives to 
the National People’s Assembly. The election was widely regarded by the international 
community as a power play by the Maduro government in order to consolidate power in the last 
branch of government that the opposition controlled (Sequera, Buitrago, 2020). The opposition 
party refused to participate, demonstrating that regardless of their influence the election would be 
rigged (Reuters). Maduro has also limited the effectiveness of the opposition party in general. 
Maduro has removed members of the opposition party from elections at all levels of government 
through a variety of tactics, but the most well-known case was the house arrest of Leopoldo 
Lopez in 2017 (Third Way). The arrest of Leopoldo Lopez came after he spent three years in a 
military prison for inciting violence against the Maduro regime (LA Times). Leopoldo Lopez 
was a well-known opposition leader that has supported Juan Guaidó as the rightful president of 
Venezuela and the opposition movement even as he escaped in 2020 to Spain to be with his 
family and continues to support the opposition movement (Maria Delgado, 2020).  
 Elections are one of the key elements to free society and democracy, but the Maduro 
regime has almost eliminated its opposition party while it holds fraudulent elections in order to 
maintain power. While an opposition party and movement does exist in Venezuela, it is severely 
restricted which allows the status quo to be maintained. Venezuela is what Donno (2019) would 
refer to as a Competitive Authoritarian Regime (CAR) as the opposition party has candidates in 
elections and there are members that hold political office although not enough to create a 
majority. CAR governments are not likely to transition to democracies due to the control that the 
state maintains over elections and Venezuela will mostly likely maintain its current status as 
there is not enough international pressure to hold credible elections. The repression of the 
opposition party in Venezuela becomes worse during and after elections as Nicolás Maduro 
attempts to debilitate the opposition party and movement even more. This repression is standard 
practice in a regime that is attempting to maintain power as they are under a certain level of 
pressure domestically and abroad (Pop Eleches and Robertson, 2015). Without the opportunity to 
vote freely and express differing opinions than those of the government without fear of 
retaliation, I theorize that people will be forced to migrate elsewhere. This situation is not 
uncommon in South America and can be seen currently in other countries like Nicaragua as the 
Ortega regime detains members of the opposition party in order to eliminate competitors in 
elections. 
 Owing to the human rights abuses and poor conditions that Venezuelans live in under the 
Maduro government, many democracies, particularly Western democracies, have placed 
economic sanctions on Venezuela. While there has been a variety of sanctions placed on 
individuals within the Venezuelan government, there have also been broader sanctions placed by 
the United States that have impacted the country’s population negatively. One of the biggest 
financial sanctions placed by the Trump Administration was prohibiting access to American 
markets by any entity of the Venezuelan government (FAS, 2021). This included the state-owned 
oil company Petróleos de Venezuela S.A.  This adversely affected the economy, leading to less 
jobs than there were already. This action in addition to Executive Order 13835, which prohibited 
the purchasing of Venezuelan debt, left the country unable to renegotiate their debt leading to 
extreme belt tightening (FAS, 2021). Owing to the belt tightening, the few social programs that 
still existed under Maduro lost significant funding. These sanctions are typical of a U.S. response 
to far-left regimes and have been utilized in South America for decades. 
 The European Union and the United States have both taken significant action against 
individuals that have propped up the Maduro regime and benefited from their corruption. Under 
the Trump Administration, the Treasury Department implemented a variety of individual 
sanctions that included Nicolas Maduro, his wife and son, along with multiple members of the 
Supreme Court, and leaders of the army and police (FAS, 2021). These sanctions helped target 
those individuals benefiting from the suppression of the Venezuelan people while creating the 
least amount of damage to the economy overall.  
 While economic sanctions may not be intended to affect the general population, most of 
the time economic sanctions imposed by external actors have devastating effects on the economy 
which forces people to look elsewhere for economic opportunities. Economic sanctions against 
authoritarian regimes, particularly personalist dictators like Nicolás Maduro, strengthen the 
resolve of a government and move the country further away from liberal tendencies (Walldorf 
Jr., 2014). By strengthening the resolve of the government but hurting its overall economy 
personalist dictators are forced to reallocate money (Escribà-Folch and Wright, 2010). These 
actions typically result in more money being placed in the military or other areas that will help 
the regime maintain power and less money being allocated for social services (Escribà-Folch and 
Wright, 2010). Without acceptable levels of social services, especially in a country such as 
Venezuela where these services were promised chavismo (the leftist political ideology that 
adheres to Hugo Chávez’s political ideals), people must live with less than normal. Without 
proper social services many people begin to look for other options including migration. 
Economic sanctions do not harm personalist dictators but places the burden on the general 
population which forces them to immigrate.  
 Even though multiple countries have sanctioned Venezuela, there are a variety of 
countries that have supported both Hugo Chávez and Nicolas Maduro which has helped keep the 
government afloat despite its challenges and setbacks. Some of these countries include China, 
Russia, and Cuba. Cuba has supported Venezuela since the beginning of the Chávez regime and 
while their impact may not be as strong now, their actions helped create some of the issues seen 
today. Both China and Russia pose as threats to regional stability due to their involvement with 
both the Chávez and the Maduro regimes. Both countries have provided economic aid, resources, 
and political cover to Nicolas Maduro when needed.   
 While economic sanctions have the ability to cripple an economy, foreign aid, such as the 
one given by China, Cuba, and Russia to Venezuela’s dictators can help mitigate the effects of 
sanctions. Supporting actions by external actors can help prop up a regime that disregards human 
rights, therefore when this occurs more people will migrate in order to escape the conditions in 
their home country. When malign external actors provide foreign aid to autocratic regimes it 
stabilizes the regime and reinforces the actions of those in power (Bader and Faust, 2014). In 
addition to this, foreign aid is also sent to countries where the leader is in danger of losing power 
(Licht, 2010). Therefore, it is understandable that leaders of autocratic regimes in need of foreign 
aid are supported by malign actors. With this support, leaders are able to funnel money into 
holding on to power instead of allocating the money towards public services. Since the Chavez 
regime, foreign actors have supported Venezuela which has impacted its citizens. Owing to the 
previous research in this area and Venezuela’s history, it can be assumed that the foreign aid 
provided to Venezuela by external actors has led to influxes in irregular migration. 
 Adding to an unstable economy that has worsened under the Maduro regime, the 
COIVD-19 pandemic has created new issues. A growing concern in South America and globally 
is the impact that the COVID-19 pandemic will have on migrants. This impact has already 
played a large role in Venezuela as many countries around the world hit the one-year anniversary 
of coronavirus shutting down their nations and economy. According to Castilla and Sørenson 
(2019), many migrants that had crossed the border prior to coronavirus displayed 
malnourishment and due to the lack of access to medicine in the country. COVID-19 has 
exacerbated these issues as many hospitals lack running water and soap in addition to the 
necessary medical supplies like ventilators that help fight the virus (Reeves, 2020). In 2017, labs 
were only able to process at 20% capacity and 85% of medicines were unavailable (Buxton, 
2018). Owing to these issues, many Venezuelans have looked to other countries to live in but 
many receiving countries have shut down their borders. Those that are able to leave move 
towards Colombia, as the border between the two countries is largely unguarded and there are 
ways around the shutdown entry ports (Palau, Rueda, 2020). There is a growing consensus that 
COVID-19 has impacted more than just the number of migrants leaving Venezuela. Many 
countries are turning away migrants or placing them into quarantine or isolation centers that will 
actually increase the spread of the disease (Ellis, 2020).    
 The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted and exacerbated the shortcomings of 
healthcare systems worldwide, but natural disasters have been leading causes of emigration 
throughout history. An example of this is in 2010 when Haiti was rocked by a 7.0 earthquake 
which led to an immediate influx of migrants (Diaz, 2020). While COVID-19 is a natural 
disaster like the earthquake in Haiti, it differs in many ways. The migration flow that stems from 
COVID-19 will be vastly different than the migration flow seen by the international community 
in 2010. People were unable to travel for over a year and while irregular migration still occurred 
the rates significantly slowed. Prior to the pandemic, it was expected that the Venezuelan 
migration crisis would surpass the Syrian refugee crisis in 2020 which did not occur due to the 
pandemic. Therefore I theorize that COVID-19 limited opportunities for migration but 
exacerbated the conditions that cause migration therefore, as restrictions ease on travel and more 
countries begin to take in migrants again there will be a surge of Venezuelans leaving.  
 During the pandemic it was expected that the Venezuelan economy would shrink by 25 
percent which would increase the lack of economic opportunities in the country (Santarelli, 
2020). In the article by Nel and Righarts (2008), motive is a concept used as a reason for civil 
unrest, but in this situation it can be applied to migration as well. Venezuela’s lack of economic 
opportunities, deteriorating healthcare system, lack of funding for public services, high levels of 
poverty, and high levels of food insecurity are motives for people to leave. COVID-19 has 
exacerbated all of these factors which will lead to sharp increase in migrants in the near future. 
Natural disasters have always been a main cause of migration and Venezuela and COVID-19 
will be no exception. 
 The final important factor is the policies that receiving countries have towards migrants 
in general but more particularly towards migrants from Venezuela. South American countries 
such as Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, and Peru, but other countries have also been impacted such as 
the United States and Spain (Cheatham, Cara Labrador, 2021). Many countries have taken in 
hundreds of thousands of migrants and are now facing an unprecedented situation with COVID-
19. In the article by Castilla and Sørensen (2019), the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees and the International Organization for migration estimated over 5,380,000 migrants 
would have left Venezuela by 2019, therefore it is possible that this migration flow could top the 
Syrian Refugee crisis. This means that as migrants start to travel again it is obvious that the 
international community is not prepared to handle the influx of migrants that many countries will 
see in the coming months and years.  
 As countries begin to open their doors and change their immigration policies, more 
migrants are willing to leave their homes in search of refuge. The history of migration in South 
America is complicated as many countries have experienced both immigration and migration 
depending on different factors such as economic opportunity and regime change (Durand and 
Massey, 2010).  Emigration that is caused by autocratic regimes has been documented in South 
America since the mid-1900s (Cerrutti and Parrado, 2015). Some of these countries include in 
the Stroessner dictatorship in Paraguay, the Pinochet regime in Chile, and many other military 
coups throughout the Southern Cone (Cerrutti and Parrado, 2015). During these migration flows 
open door policies helped migrants find work and assimilate until they were able to return to 
their home country, if they choose to do so. Therefore it is not surprising that many South 
American countries have taken in Venezuelan migrants, but what is different with this migration 
is the increasing number of migrants that are leaving. I theorize that the open-door policies that 




 Human rights abuses span a variety of different areas in daily life from a lack of free and 
fair elections to arbitrary detentions. There are a variety of variables that fall under human rights 
abuses that may have a connection to the influx of migrants leaving Venezuela. While there is 
debate about how much these abuses impact the average citizen, an example being the detention 
of opposition leader Leopoldo Lopez, it is clear that many Venezuelans have felt the effects of 
the Maduro regime and have been forced to leave. For some migrants it is a variety of these 
human rights abuses that have forced them to flee their homes. The Maduro regime has held 
power in Venezuela since 2013 and the lives of Venezuelans has progressively gotten worse. 
 It is important to note that migration within South America owing to autocratic regimes 
and human rights violations (Cerrutti and Parrado, 2015). What separates the Venezuelan 
migration crisis from past migration history is the historic number of people that have left 
Venezuela which currently is estimated to over 5 million. While there are many other factors that 
lead to migration, it is important to recognize that human rights abuses perpetrated by the 
government. have been a leading problem in South America since the mid-1900s. For these 
reasons, I argue that the various human rights abuses perpetrated by the Chavez and Maduro 
regime have caused emigration from Venezuela. The hypotheses I propose are: 
H1: As the Maduro government limits freedom of the press, more people will flee Venezuela.  
H2: As the Maduro regimes represses the political system, more people will immigrate to other 
countries. 
H3: As the Maduro regimes represses the opposition party, more people will immigrate to other 
countries. 
H4: As arbitrary detentions continue; more people will emigrate from Venezuela. 
H5: As state sponsored violence continues to be a problem in Venezuela, more people will 
immigrate to other countries. 
H6: As external actors place economic sanctions, there will be more Venezuelans leaving their 
home country. 
H7: Foreign aid has supported the Maduro regime, which has increased the number of migrants 
leaving Venezuela. 
H8: As COVID-19 pandemic continues worsen, there will be increased levels of emigration from 
Venezuela to other nations.  
H9: As receiving countries open their borders, more Venezuelan migrants will leave their 
country. 
Analysis 
Freedom of the Press 
 Since the Chavez regime, freedom of the press has been limited and Nicolás Maduro has 
furthered the actions of his predecessor. Media and the press have been the target of the state 
since Maduro came to power in 2013. Some of the actions used to target the press include 
controlling news outlets/broadcasts that are critical of the regime through censorship, detentions 
of journalists, deporting journalists, and the spread of false information that is broadcasted by 
state media. These actions have left many Venezuelans without the basic information that is used 
in daily life such as information regarding elections, politics, and violence. Without this 
information, the Maduro regime has been able to continue its oppression of the Venezuelan 
population without independent reporting to address the issue. While general oppression 
increases in Venezuela, so does the number of migrants looking to leave. This repression of free 
media and increase in propaganda from the government has impacted many Venezuelans 
decision to immigrate.  
 State run media outlets have become more common under the Maduro regime which has 
led to less independent reporting. Since 2013, 115 media outlets have closed under the Maduro 
regime which has left the population with few options to choose from (Share America). By 
eliminating potential media outlets, the Venezuelan government can control the storyline. Many 
times, this storyline includes false information or censorship that is intended to prop up the 
Maduro regime. An example of false information is when there was a historic blackout that 
lasted longer than five days that impacted almost the entire country (The Borgen Project). While 
the cause of the blackout was a technical issue at the Guri Dam that supplies 80% percent of the 
country with power it was originally reported by Nicolás Maduro that the cause was an 
cyberattack perpetrated by the United States (The Borgen Project). When false information is 
spread by government entities and there is no independent watchdog to contradict or investigate 
those statements, the general population is left in the dark wondering whether they can trust their 
government which attributes to the democratic backsliding that has plagued Venezuela since the 
early 2000s. When democratic backsliding occurs, it common to see waves of out migration from 
the affected country. 
 While false information is a threat to Venezuela, so is censorship. Under the Maduro 
government censorship has become more common and occurs in a variety of ways. One way that 
the government censors independent media is through legal investigations (Human Rights 
Watch). A newspaper business, Panorama, was forced to shut down when the business came 
under investigation by the Administration of Customs, Duties, and Taxes for alleged improper 
actions regarding the business’s taxes (Human Rights Watch). A second example of legal action 
is when La Patilla, a news website, had multiple members of its staff, including founder Alberto 
Ravell, faced a criminal defamation lawsuit after republishing information from a foreign news 
source that stated Diosdado Cabello, a pro Maduro politician, was involved in drug trafficking 
(Human Rights Watch). During this lawsuit a court order attempted to forced Ravell and the staff 
to stay in Venezuela which led to Ravell and other staff members to fleeing the country. Another 
tool for censorship that the government utilizes is blocking access to a variety of websites and 
social media platforms. This form of censorship is the most effective because it eliminates 
messaging from international sources and the opposition party. The Maduro regime has blocked 
access to YouTube, Instagram, Periscope, online news sites, and VPNs to control the flow of 
information (Nugent, 2019). It is also common for live events or speeches from Juan Guaido 
streamed on social media or other websites to be inaccessible as the Maduro regime will shut 
down access to the platform (Nugent, 2019). Internet freedom has steadily decreased in 
Venezuela under the Maduro regime which can be demonstrated in Figure 1 that includes 
Freedom House scores and various examples. According to Venezuela Sin Filtro, an independent 
internet freedom watchdog in Venezuela, in 2019 there was a concert in Colombia to raise 
awareness and funds for aid to go to Venezuela and the Venezuelan government blocked live 
streams of the concert. Censorship is a threat to democracy and when people are unable to access 










     Figure 1   Source: Freedom House 
 Detentions and deportations of independent journalists have become common practice in 
Venezuela which has repressed independent media as people become fearful to report on issues. 
According to Reporters Without Borders, it is common for domestic journalists to face threats 
and physical violence whereas foreign journalists are arrested and deported. These are tools that 
the Maduro regime uses in order to suppress independent journalism and control the media. In 
2018, 22 journalists were detained, and less than six months into 2019, 39 journalists had been 
detained (Share America). These numbers reflect a need for the Maduro regime to control 
journalists to maintain power. There have also been various reports of physical violence against 
journalists. One example is when Elyangelica Gonzalez, a reporter from Univision, was attacked 
by the Venezuelan military when covering a protest in 2017 (Share America). Luis Carlos Díaz, 
an employee of Unión Radio, was arrested on his way home from working at a local radio station 
and while under arrest was tortured by the Venezuelan government (Share America). Jorge 
Ramos, who worked for Univision, was deported from Venezuela after his crew’s materials were 
confiscated be he asked Nicolás Maduro to address human rights abuses and the increasing issue 
of food insecurity in the country (Share America).   
 Another journalist Joseph Poliszuk has also been held by Venezuelan police and other 
































within the Venezuelan government (Nugent, 2019). Detentions of journalists became a larger 
issue during COVID-19. Many reporters believed that COVID-19 cases were being 
underreported by the government and many independent news organizations wanted to 
investigate. Between March 2020 and July 2020 15 reporters were detained by Venezuelan 
authorities (Pulitzer Center). Gleybert Asencio, Yonathan Torres, and Ronald Montaño, 
members of a digital news media source, Crónico Uno, were detained by Venezuelan forces 
when reporting on COVID-19 and were accused of falsely increasing the number of COVID-19 
positive cases in their stories (Pulitzer Center). 
 Repression of journalists has forced reporters and their families to leave the country 
citing safety concerns (Reporters Without Borders). Tamoa Calzadilla ran the investigative team 
for Últimas Noticias, which forced her to publish information regarding protesters that had no 
factual basis (Human Rights Watch). This incident forced her quit her job as she could not 
continue to publish false or misleading information. Calzadilla’s husband, David Maris, 
interviewed Leopoldo López’s wife for his job, but the Bolivarian National Guard took his 
camera and equipment to stop publication of the interview (Human Rights Watch). These 
incidents forced Calzadilla and Maris to leave the country, they now work for Univision in 
Miami, Florida (Human Rights Watch). When journalists face abuses by the government the role 
of watchdog is eroded, and people lose faith in their government. Repressing freedom of the 
press not only forces journalists and their families to leave the country but pushes others to leave 
their homes as well.  
Political Repression 
 Over the last eight years, Nicolás Maduro has consolidated government power to solidify 
his political power. There have been two main tactics used by Maduro to gain power and these 
include holding fraudulent elections and altering the composition of the government. By using 
these tactics, the Venezuelan government has lost its democratic characteristics and moved 
towards an authoritarian regime. Since 2013, the Venezuelan population has slowly lost control 
of its government and these actions have forced many people to leave Venezuela in search of 
refuge. 
 Manipulating elections has been one of the main tools used by the Maduro regime to 
increase their power. There are three main examples that demonstrate how Nicolás Maduro has 
been able to effectively consolidate power through election manipulation. First, in 2017, Maduro 
announced the creation of National Constituent Assembly in 2017 “as a mechanism for conflict 
resolution” (Buxton, 2018). This move was used to bypass the legitimate national legislature of 
Venezuela (the National People’s Assembly). The action was widely regarded by the 
international community as another power move by the Maduro regime and the National 
People’s Assembly rejected the move as well. After this national decree and national elections 
for the NCA Smartmatic, the voting service for Venezuela, went public with information that the 
number of voters had been manipulated by the government demonstrating that election was 
unfair (Buxton, 2018). According to Buxton (2018), the Venezuelan government stated that 8.1 
million Venezuelans had voted when, 30 minutes prior to polls closing, only 3.7 million 
Venezuelans had voted.  
 Second, in 2020 Venezuela held parliamentary elections which were severely restricted 
as many members of the opposition were not able to run (Sequera, Buitrago, 2020). The election 
was seen as a power move by the Maduro regime to hold power in all three branches of 
government. By severely restricting opposition parties, Maduro’s party was able to easily win a 
majority within the National People’s Assembly. Finally, and in conjunction with the 2020 
elections, Nicolás Maduro placed food centers next to polling stations to influence the outcome 
of the election (Third Way). This action preyed on a population that is food insecure in order to 
alter the status quo (USAID).  
 During Nicolás Maduro’s time in power, he has been able to gain control of both the 
legislature and the Supreme Court. While his power within the legislature mostly stemmed from 
election manipulation and repression of the opposition party, it was also supported by the 
Supreme Court. In 2015, Maduro exercised his power through a lame duck Congress to expand 
the Supreme Court to thirteen members (Vyas, Kurmanaev, 2015). This action allowed Maduro 
to effectively control the actions of the next Congress, but more importantly allowed the 
Supreme Court to create laws that allowed Maduro’s party to win in the 2020 elections and 
control two opposing parties (Vyas, Kurmanaev, 2015). By manipulating the composition of the 
government, holding fraudulent elections, and creating the NCA, Nicolás Maduro has repressed 
the political system of Venezuela. Its population is unable to vote freely and all democratic 
norms that act as checks and balances have been eliminated. Without the ability to participate in 
government nor petition their government for changes, many Venezuelans feel as if there is no 
hope and the only way to create a better life is to migrate.  
Repression of the Opposition Party 
 One human rights abuse that has occurred under Nicolás Maduro is repressing the 
opposition party. Many of the actions that repress the opposition party fall under a variety of 
human rights abuses such as lack of free speech, arbitrary detentions, and a lack of fair and free 
elections. Without a strong opposition party, the Maduro government has been able to strengthen 
itself to the point where it is nearly untouchable. The Venezuelan population has no legitimate 
alternative to the Maduro regime and without the opportunity to vote in an opposition party that 
is focused on rebuilding their country, many Venezuelans have made the difficult choice to leave 
their home. 
 Nicolás Maduro has arrested not only dissidents and journalists that oppose his views, but 
also prominent political leaders of the opposition movement. Arbitrary detentions will be 
analyzed in the next section of this analysis, but it is important to recognize some important 
arrests. Most recently, two congressmen were arrested in 2020 by Las Fuerzas Acciones 
Especiales (Amnesty International). Congressman Renzo Prieto was arrested in March 2020 with 
two of his assistants after they participated in pro Guaido protest (U.S. Embassy Venezuela). 
This is the second time that Prieto has been arrested under the Maduro regime with his first 
arbitrary arrest occurring in 2014 which lasted four years as he was held at El Helicoide 
(Amnesty International). Congressman Gilber Caro was arrested at the end of 2019 and his 
detention continued into 2020 on charges of terrorism (Sequera, 2020). Both of these arrests are 
illegal due to the fact that members of Congress have immunity while they are members 
(Sequera, 2020). The arrest of Leopoldo Lopez in 2017 was beginning of long campaign against 
the opposition party (Third Way). Leopoldo Lopez was the face of the opposition movement 
until his three-year arrest that was spent in a military prison (LA Times). His arrest led to the rise 
of Juan Guaido who is now the leader of the opposition movement within Venezuela. Juan 
Guaido’s actions have been severely limited by the Maduro regime to maintain its authoritarian 
government. As mentioned previously, live streams of Juan Guaido’s speeches and social media 
posts regarding the opposition movement are frequently blocked by the government to eliminate 
any potential threats to the Maduro’s power.  
 Finally, it is also important to address how manipulated elections have led to one party 
maintaining power in the legislature. While it has been noted that in 2020 the Supreme Court 
helped eliminate potential competition, it should also be highlighted that many opposition 
members did not run for reelection to either protest the corrupt political system and fraudulent 
elections in Venezuela or did not run for the safety of them and their families (Sequera, Buitrago, 
2020). Many opposition political members and dissidents have been forced to leave Venezuela as 
they receive threats and fear arbitrary arrest of them or their family members for holding political 
beliefs opposite of those of the government. For the reasons outlined above the opposition party 
in Venezuela is weak and poses a weak threat to the Maduro regime without a strong showing of 
support by the international community. While members of the opposition party and those who 
share their ideals leave the country, many Venezuelans are left with no option to reform their 
government and must look for a new place to restart their lives. 
Arbitrary Detentions 
 Arbitrary detentions and house arrests are another tool in arsenal for Nicolas Maduro to 
use against those that threaten his power. While journalists and political figures are targets, many 
average citizens have also been arrested by the Maduro regime. Many average citizens are 
arrested at political protests supporting the opposition movement. Since 2014 over 15,000 people 
have been arrested in connection to these protests (Human Rights Watch). These protests are 
often meet with excessive force by the police and military and hundreds of arrested (Amnesty 
International). While many of these arrests occur at protests, there are also reports of warrantless 
arrests occurring at people’s homes and some are charged in military courts. It is also reported 
that torture occurs once people are under arrest.  
 Many university students, activists, and political leaders have been arrested by a variety 
of Venezuelan authorities. One of the most notorious holding locations is El Heliocoide which is 
well known for the human rights abuses that occur there. Originally El Heliocoide was going to 
be a drive through shopping mall, but now it is used as a holding cell for hundreds of prisoners 
that range from student activists to well-known opposition leaders (Newland, 2019). Within the 
building there were a variety of holding cells, but one known as Guantanamo was the worst as it 
would hold roughly 50 prisoners with no light, air, or toilets and was very small (Newland, 
2019). Many detainees recall being physically abused, receiving electric shocks, being suspended 
by their wrists, raped, and psychologically tortured (Newland, 2019). These types of actions 
were systematic and were put in place to create fear among the detainees. 
 Detentions of political figures is a common tool to silence the opposition party and there 
have been high profile detentions under the Maduro regime. In 2017, Leopoldo Lopez was 
placed under arrest for inciting violence at a protest against the Maduro regime (LA Times). 
After his arrest, Lopez was placed under house arrest until he was able to escape in 2020 to live 
in Spain and be reunited with his family while continuing to support the opposition movement. A 
second high profile case was in 2014 when Rosmit Mantilla was arrested (Newland, 2019). 
Mantilla was a well-known activist, supporter of gay rights, and after his detention was the first 
openly gay member of the National People’s Assembly (Newland, 2019). Rosmit Mantilla was 
placed under arrest and held at El Helicoide until his eventual release, but afterwards he fled the 
country fearing that he would eventually be arrested again (Newland, 2019). After the 2020 
parliamentary elections many opposition members, including Juan Guaido did not run citing that 
the election outcomes would not be fair, but with this the members lost immunity. Therefore, 
there are widespread concerns that Guaido could be subject to arrest or house arrest under the 
Maduro regime. Arbitrary detentions of citizens, journalist, university students, and political 
figures have instilled fear in the Venezuelan population and therefore has forced many citizens to 
flee to live safer and more predictable lives. 
State Sponsored Violence 
 State sponsored violence instills fear in a general population which leads to them to live 
suppressed lives and forces people to immigrate. A major group that supports the Maduro regime 
and arbitrarily arrests and kills citizens is Las Fuerzas de Acciones Especiales (FAES). This 
group was created in 2017 under the guise of protecting communities vulnerable to violence and 
drug trafficking but has targeted these populations and charged them with crimes of resisting the 
authorities (Olmo, 2019). Many people have been arbitrarily detained or killed by these forces 
and some family members have stated that torture is common tactic used after an arrest (Olmo, 
2019). Even as FAES becomes more active in these areas, many people will not report these 
situations to international organizations because there are fearful and there are few if any police 
reports owing to corruption and the fact that FAES is a government organization. The United 
Nations has investigated this group and they assassinated over 5,000 people in 2018 alone 
(Cumming-Bruce, 2019). While there has been an investigation, there has been little action 
against the group as the United Nations has no way to regulate what occurs within Venezuela’s 
borders 
 While FAES does hold a prominent place in state sponsored violence colectivos play a 
large role as well. A colectivo is an armed group that is sponsored by the Venezuelan 
government (Gonzalez, 2019). These were created under Hugo Chávez and were paired with 
community councils to be closer to local actions (Gonzalez, 2019). These community councils 
were supposed to be spaces for communities to voice their opinions on how local funding should 
be spent and resembled democratic ideals (Bean, 2015). Any movement in human rights 
standards and democracy that could have derived from these communal councils was diminished 
with the introduction of the colectivos that reported back to the government. Colectivos have 
taken on a bigger role under Maduro and are present at opposition rallies. It is common for them 
to join the police and military in controlling opposition protests and sometimes doing so with 
excessive forces (Oppmann, 2019). According to the 2021 Human Rights report from Human 
Rights Watch, colectivos have played an important in role in the COVID-19 lockdowns that 
occurred in 2020. During lockdowns colectivos enforced stay at home orders in impoverished 
neighborhoods and those that violated the order received various punishments that included 
beatings and various torture methods (Human Rights Watch) In addition to colectivos there are 
various armed groups including the National Liberation Army and Patriotic Forces of National 
Liberation that conspire with polices forces and the military to maintain control of sections of 
Venezuela (Human rights Watch). The methods used to control the population include murder, 
forced labor, and rape (Human Rights Watch). Their roles are not only paramilitary, but they are 
also there to support the Maduro regime and its ideologies as being leaders within their 
communities (Open Democracy). State sponsored violence has led to the detentions and deaths 
of many Venezuelans and with no mechanisms to protect themselves, a large portion of the 
population has left the country in search of a safer place to live. 
COVID-19 Pandemic 
 The COVID-19 pandemic has greatly impacted the future of migrants in South America. 
COVID-19 has altered the situation in Venezuela greatly and will lead to more migrants leaving 
the country. One of the situations that COVID-19 has exacerbated is the decaying health system 
in Venezuela. Since 2017, the number of cases and deaths for preventable illnesses has increased 
which forced the government to allow for some humanitarian aid that was distributed through 
nongovernmental organizations (Buxton, 2018). With limited medical supplies, testing 
capacities, lab capacities, and doctors COVID-19 has infected many people and has caused many 
deaths. These resources have significantly declined since 2017 when the country’s lab 
capabilities were processing at 20% capacity and 85% of routine medicines were unavailable 
(Buxton, 2018). According to the United Nations, 60 to 100 percent of essential drugs are not 
available in major cities such as Caracas as preventable diseases like measles and diphtheria have 
seen an increase in cases. In addition to the lack of medical supplies, Venezuela has suffered 
from a phenomenon known as brain drain. Since the Chávez regime doctors have been leaving 
the country for a variety of reasons. Between 2008 to 2009 2,000 doctors left Venezuela which 
accounted for 10 percent of the nation’s doctors (Hernández and Gómez, 2011). According to the 
World Health Organization, there have been almost 260,000 COVID-19 cases and just under 
3,000 deaths. While these numbers are lower than some of the statistics, there are concerns that 
Venezuelan government is not being transparent about the number of positive cases nor deaths in 
the country. This concern was highlighted in the section under repression of freedom of the press 
as journalists have been arrested while attempting to demonstrate the reality of COVID-19 in the 
country. 
 COVID-19 has impacted migration as it has greatly restricted movement as lockdowns 
have decreased migration flows. Many Venezuelans were unable to leave the country due to 
lockdowns, but now that borders have opened there have been increases in migration flows 
globally. Both during lockdowns and after lockdowns many Venezuelans have left for Colombia 
and Argentina as the border is porous and there are many ways to enter without going near 
shutdown ports of entry (The Associated Press). A fear that many countries now have is their 
ability to handle the influx of migrants and the potential threat of COVID-19 and COVID-19 
variants. Many countries are dealing with this issue currently and it is important that NGOs and 
the international community continue supporting developing nations in migration and the 
necessary medical resources to continue permitting immigration (Ellis, 2020). COVID-19 has 
disrupted the migration flow out of Venezuela, but as the healthcare system is affected by 
COVID-19 and information regarding cases is withheld by the government, more Venezuelans 
are seeking a country to live in. 
Economic Sanctions 
 The Venezuelan economy relies predominately on oil and depends almost entirely on oil 
exports in order to import a majority of goods including food and medicine. This reliance was 
established under the Chávez government as many social programs were introduced while the 
government focused solely on exporting oil. While this approach worked for a few years under 
the Chávez government, it proved to be unsustainable and creates a highly volatile economy as 
the price of oil fluctuates. Therefore, when oil prices have gone down, as occurred in 2008, 2017, 
and 2020, the economy begins to crumble, and the people of Venezuela suffer. Oil prices have 
continued to fall since then with the coronavirus pandemic, which led to a global halt in 
transportation and production, which adversely affected the Venezuelan economy. In addition to 
this, the Maduro regime responded to the post Great Recession difficulties by printing more 
money which led to high levels of inflation (Third Way). According to Buxton (2018), this 
inflation hit 2,616% in 2017 and eventually this helped led to largest economic collapse that was 
not caused by a war in the last 45 years (Kurmanaev, 2019). The combination of the dependence 
on oil and  the severe economic sanctions placed on Venezuela by a majority of the Western 
world have caused many Venezuelans to be unable to afford basic necessities, and there are few 
opportunities for economic advancement. This has led to increasing numbers of Venezuelan 
migrants in neighboring countries looking to start new lives. 
 American sanctions on Venezuela have played a prominent role in U.S. foreign policy 
since 2014 under the Obama Administration. In 2014, Congress passed the Venezuela Defense 
of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 which laid out a plan to work with the 
international community and international organization such as the Organization of American 
States to support Venezuelan society restore respect for human rights (Congressional Archives). 
This piece of legislation also allowed for sanctions on individuals that were aiding the human 
rights abuses in Venezuela (Congressional Archives). Acting upon this, President Obama issued 
an executive order sanctioning seven high level members of Venezuelan security forces and 
members of the government (Obama White House Archives). These sanctions highlighted the 
level of seriousness that the U.S. government took human rights abuses in Venezuela.  
 Under the Trump Administration, economic sanctions continued to play an important role 
in addressing the deteriorating situation in Venezuela. In addition to sanctions new executive 
orders were put into place that had a larger impact on the economy which therefore further 
pushed Venezuela into an economic down spiral. One of the biggest financial sanctions placed 
by the Trump Administration was prohibiting access to American markets by any entity of the 
Venezuelan government (FAS, 2021). This included the state-owned oil company, Petróleos de 
Venezuela S.A., which adversely affected the economy leading to less jobs. This action in 
addition to Executive Order 13835, that prohibited the purchasing of Venezuelan debt and 
leaving the country unable to negotiate their debt leading to extreme belt tightening (FAS, 2021). 
Owing to the belt tightening by the new austerity policies that the government put into place, the 
few social programs that still existed under the Maduro regime lost significant funding. In 
addition to these broader sanctions, the Trump Administration’s Treasury Department 
implemented a variety of individual sanctions including Nicolás Maduro, his wife and son, 
multiple members of the Supreme Court, and leaders of the army and police (FAS, 2021). These 
sanctions help target those individuals that are benefiting from the suppression of the Venezuelan 
people while creating the least amount of damage to the economy overall.  
 Since early 2021, the European Union began implementing a variety of sanctions that has 
led to increased tensions between Venezuela and the European bloc. In February of 2021, the 
European Union placed sanctions on more than 19 individuals within the Venezuelan 
government which increased the total number of affected individuals to 55 (Emmott, 2021). 
These sanctions include travel bans and the freezing of assets (Emmott, 2021). Responding to 
these sanctions, the Venezuelan government declared the European Union Ambassador, Isabel 
Brilhante Pedrosa, a persona non grata and gave her seventy-two hours to leave country 
(Buchard, 2021). This was one of the most aggressive moves of the Maduro regime in response 
to actions taken by the European Union. Economic sanctions do not only adversely affect 
individuals, but also affect the greater population as whole. As leaders lose money, they often 
decrease funding to social programs and make conditions in the country unlivable, therefore it is 
unsurprising that as economic sanctions have become the main tool for fighting the Maduro 
government, more Venezuelans have left the country. 
Supporting External Actors 
 Foreign aid from external actors can help authoritarian regimes maintain power while 
economic sanctions hurt the economy. Venezuela is no exception, and has received aid from 
Cuba, Russia, and China which has eased the effects of sanctions and provided some stability. 
Historically, Cuba was the biggest supporter of Venezuela as Fidel Castro supported Hugo 
Chávez from the start and the two nations helped build regional continuity for a short period of 
time. A majority of Cuban aid was provided through the military and members of the Cuban 
army worked and currently work as the eyes on the ground for both Cuba and Chávez and 
Maduro. After the death of Chávez and Castro and the introduction of bigger players on the 
international stage, Cuba’s role has diminished in the country although their presence is still felt. 
According to Ellis (2020), Cuban intelligence still plays an important role for the Venezuelan 
government as the intelligence that they gather provides a clearer picture on the threats facing the 
regime not only externally, but internally as the Venezuelan opposition movement continues to 
grow. This allows for the colectivos and FAES to be aware of internal threats which enables 
human rights abuses to occur. In terms of the economy, Cuba continues to buy oil from 
Venezuela but not at a high rate (Ellis, 2020). Even though Cuba is not a huge importer of 
Venezuelan oil, every dollar that is used on Venezuelan oil helps prop up the Maduro regime. 
While Cuban support for the Venezuelan government has decreased it is important to realize how 
history has created another ally for the Maduro regime.  
 Russia has played an increasing role in Venezuela under both the Chavez and the Maduro 
regime has come to power in Venezuela. Over the last 15 years, Russia has provided both 
financial and military aid to Venezuela that enabled human rights abuses. Russia has been one of 
the top consumers of Venezuelan oil and the amount of debt that Venezuela owes to Russia has 
proven to be extremely important. Rosneft, an entity currently owned by the Russian 
government, originally loaned $17 billion to Venezuela (Ellis, 2020). When the government was 
unable to pay back the debts, Rosneft took the opportunity to exchange the debt for control of 
gas reserves allowing Russia to have unfettered access to Venezuelan oil (Farah and Babineau, 
2019). This gave economic relief to the country as Venezuelan markets were unable to access 
American markets owing to sanctions put in place by the Trump Administration and allowed 
Russia continued access to a natural resource it wanted. Another way that Russia provided 
Venezuela with a way to find relief from U.S. sanctions was the creation of cryptocurrency 
which proved to be ineffective (Farah and Babineau, 2019). Venezuela has also bought $11 
million worth of military equipment from Russia alone since 2005 in addition to the aid they 
receive from China (Farah and Babineau, 2019).  
 In addition to arms, Venezuela has also been the beneficiary of tactical support from 
Russia. Between 2019 and 2020, Russia deployed some of its military to the country which has 
bolstered the Maduro regime (Ellis, 2020). The amount of military aid Venezuela has received 
from Russia is what gives the country a formidable military and allows the Maduro regime to 
control its population as its police, paramilitary units, and military units benefit from these 
purchases. While it appears that this is minimal over a large period of time, it is important to note 
that the financial support, the purchasing of Venezuelan oil, and military support aids the 
Maduro government which in turn enables human rights abuses as the amount of funding that 
benefits the public has greatly decreased under Nicolás Maduro. 
 China has played an increased role in Latin American under its Silk Road Initiative and 
its Belt and Road Initiative. Venezuela was one of the countries to receive the highest amounts of 
foreign direct investment. China has loaned Venezuela $62 billion since 2008 and was a large 
consumer of Venezuelan oil and despite U.S. sanctions there is evidence that China continued to 
buy oil through Rosneft (Ellis, 2020). In addition to buying oil, China’s national oil company 
still holds a land grant in the Orinoco Belt region which is one of the most oil rich areas in the 
world (Rendon, 2021). This land grant does not expire until 2035 providing China with access to 
Venezuelan oil for years to come (Rendon, 2021). By loaning money and propping up the 
Venezuelan economy, the People’s Republic of China is helping to dampen the effects of EU and 
U.S. sanctions which provides Nicolás Maduro with the opportunity to continue oppressing his 
people. This support does not only come in the form of investment, but also in terms of military 
aid and basic necessities. In 2019, China aided Venezuela with roughly 40% of its food imports 
and has continued to provide military aid in the form of aircrafts and armored vehicles (Ellis, 
2020). It has been widely known that the Maduro regime uses food as a tactic to force the 
Venezuelan people to vote a certain way or pursue other courses of action, in addition to this 
some armored vehicles provided by China have been used by the government to stop pro Guiadó 
or anti Maduro protests (Ellis, 2020). Chinese weapons and crowd control weapons for protests 
were used extensively in 2017 protests that led to 2,000 injuries and 163 deaths (Rendon, 2021). 
China has aided the Maduro regime financially and in terms of its military which allowed for 
Nicolás Maduro to maintain power and continue committing human rights violations. 
Receiving Countries Policies 
The final important variable is the policies that receiving countries have towards migrants in 
general but more particularly towards Venezuelan migrants. South American countries such as 
Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina and Peru have been impacted as well as the United States, 
Spain, and some Caribbean countries as seen in Figure 2 (Cheathem, Cara Labrador, 2021). In 
the article by Castilla and Sørenson (2019), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
and the International Organization for Migration estimated that over 5,380,000 migrants would 
have left Venezuelan by 2019 and the Brookings Institute estimated that the number could have 
been greater than six million which would have topped the Syrian Refugee Crisis. This means 
that as migrants start to travel again it is obvious that the international community must prepare 

















   Figure 2 Source: The Council on Foreign Relations 
 Colombia is the country that have taken in the highest number of migrants since 2015. In 
2021, Colombia made an unprecedented move by providing a new status to previously 
undocumented Venezuelans in the country. Colombian President Iván Duque has implemented a 
new plan that will allow Venezuelans to live and work in Colombia for 10 years which provides 
a new temporary status that migrants previously lacked (Otis, 2021). This will lead to increase in 
the number of migrants attempting to go to Colombia as this status allows them to build a life. It 
is estimated that by 2022 almost three to five million Venezuelans could live in Colombia, and it 
is possible that this number will climb with the addition of this legal status (Buschschlüter, 
2021). According to the New York Times, President Duque did put emphasis on the need for 
international support as his nation has suffered the most from this crisis and he did emphasize the 
need for other countries to follow Colombia’s lead which will be difficult as the pandemic 
continues to damage the South American economy.  
 In comparison to Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Chile have reversed their open policies 
towards Venezuelan migrants. During the begin of the migration crisis, Peru had a welcoming 
policy allowing Venezuelans to live and work in the country, but within the last few years these 
policies have changed radically. Peru started to implement a series of laws that were focused on 
limiting migration which came in the wake of the Venezuelan migration crisis (Amnesty 
International). These laws have not changed since the beginning of the pandemic, but as 
countries such as Colombia and the United States begin to provide temporary status to migrants 
there is hope that their policies will change. In 2019, Ecuador followed Peru’s lead and began to 
require visas from Venezuelans that wanted to work and live in the country as thousands rushed 
to the border (Reuters). Also in 2019, Chile created the democratic responsibility visa providing 
Venezuelans with legal status for up to two years, but this policy did not benefit Venezuelans 
who clearly needed a long-term solution (Reuters). These actions limited the number of legal 
migrants that came to those nations legally but increased the number of migrants crossing the 
borders illegally and gave employers the opportunity to exploit vulnerable people in need of a 
stable economic situation.  
 While Spain has taken in migrants, their stance on Venezuela is extremely complicated 
owing to their coalition government and the parties differing stances on the political issues in 
Venezuela. It is important to highlight that the colonial and immigration connection between 
Spain and Venezuela. It is common to see migration between colonial powers and their colonies, 
because of the shared history, culture, and language (Cerrutti and Parrado, 2015). It should also 
be highlighted that there is a history of migration flows between Venezuela and Spain as during 
and after Spain’s Civil War many Spaniards migrated to Venezuela. The United States has 
started to play a larger role internationally with the Biden Administration providing Temporary 
Protected Status (TPS) to Venezuelans until September 2022 when the situation in the country 
will be reevaluated to see if it is safe for Venezuelans living in the United States to return (Sands, 
Shoichet, 2021). While both the United States and Spain have provided safety for over 600,000 
Venezuelans, these two countries can do more and are uniquely positioned to lead the charge on 
the Venezuelan migration and political issue. 
Conclusion 
 By using qualitative data, this research paper has demonstrated the extent to which 
human rights abuses have played into the mass exodus of Venezuelans that has pushed South 
American countries to the brink of their resources. Variables such as political repression, 
oppressing the opposition party, economic sanctions, supporting actions by external state actors, 
violence, the policies of receiving nations, arbitrary detentions, state sponsored violence, and the 
coronavirus pandemic have provided a different outlook on how human rights abuses are tied to 
these variables which has a direct impact on the migration flows that the international 
community sees coming out of Venezuela. It is also important to highlight that these variables 
are also intrinsically connected to one another and many times these migrants are leaving for a 
variety reasons that are explained within these variables. While it is not possible to say that 
human rights abuses are the main variable that has led to emigration, it is obvious that it plays a 
large role in the current situation that the international community faces. The addition of some 
data provides a picture that demonstrates a delicate situation that has progressively gotten worse 
since the transition from Hugo Chávez to Nicolás Maduro. It also provides an alarming outlook 
as to how a new variable, COVID-19, has played and will continue to play a large role in the 
next wave of migration that South America which is unequipped to handle the health situation 
with their own citizens let alone migrants.  
 This analysis provides support for nine hypotheses proposed in this paper. Repression of 
freedom of the press, the political system, and the opposition party has worsened under the 
Maduro regime leading to more people migrating to places where they work, speak, and vote 
freely as well have a better future. Economic sanctions put in place by the United States and the 
European Union have aided the downward spiral of Venezuela’s economy which has forced 
many people to leave the country as they can’t afford rising prices of basic necessities nor find 
economic opportunities. Supporting actions from external actors, such as Russia and China, have 
aided the Venezuelan government’s systematic oppression of its citizens forcing the population 
to leave the country. Finally, the onset of COVID-19 has exacerbated many of these variables 
such as freedom of the press and has forced many Venezuelans to leave the country in search of 
a new home with economic opportunities and stronger healthcare system. While this research 
design is limited as it is impossible to understand why each of the over five million migrants 
have left the country, it is an attempt to see how human rights abuses affect multiple areas of life 
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